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DE-INDUSTRIALISATION, ‘PREMATURE’ DE-INDUSTRIALISATION AND THE 
DUTCH-DISEASE 
 




Abstract: Although the structure of employment has changed substantially over the long-term 
course of economic development, a drop of the scale and speed as the one that has taken place 
in manufacturing among industrialised and high middle–income countries in the last decades 
constitute an unprecedented phenomenon. In the analysis I distinguish between four sources 
of de-industrialisation, and develop a new concept of the ‘Dutch-disease’. I also offer a new 
approach to the understanding of ‘premature’ de-industrialisation, a phenomenon that has  
characterised Latin America since the beginning of the neo-liberal economic and political 
reforms, and conclude that it contains important components of policy-induced ‘uncreative 
destruction’. Finally, I discuss how rapid de-industrialisation has reopened an age-old debate 
in economic theory: is a unit value added in manufacturing equal to one in commodities, 
finance or services, especially in terms of its growth-enhancing properties?  
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DESINDUSTRIALIZAÇÃO, DESINDUSTRIALIZAÇÃO PREMATURA E DOENÇA 
HOLANDESA 
 
Resumo: Embora a estrutura do emprego tenha mudado substancialmente no 
desenvolvimento econômico a longo prazo, a queda em termos de escala e de velocidade que 
tomou conta da esfera industrial nos países industrializados e com níveis de renda médio e 
alto nas últimas décadas constitui um fenômeno sem precedentes. Nessa análise eu estou 
distinguindo as quarto fontes de desindustrialização e desenvolvendo um conceito novo sobre 
doença holandesa. Eu também ofereço neste artigo um novo arcabouço teórico sobre 
“desindustrialização prematura”, um fenômeno que tem caracterizado a América Latina desde 
que começaram as reformas econômicas e políticas de caráter neoliberal, concluindo que este 
fenômeno contém um componente importante de políticas induzidas de destruição não 
criativa. Finalmente, eu discuto como a desindustrialização tem reaparecido do antigo debate 
da teoria econômica, deixando a seguinte questão: é a unidade de valor acrescentada nas 
fábricas igual as das commodities, das finanças e dos serviços, especialmente em termos de 
aumento de suas propriedades? 
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One of the most notable stylised facts of the last third of the 20
th
 century is the rapid 
decline in manufacturing employment in industrialised countries (a drop of about 25 million 
jobs).  Although the structure of employment has changed substantially over the long-term 
course of economic development, changes of the scale and speed during this period constitute 
an unprecedented phenomenon  --  manufacturing employment in the European Union, for 
example, dropped by more than a third.  Moreover, as manufacturing is an activity that some 
consider a crucial driver of outward shifts of the production frontier (e.g. in Post-Keynesian, 
Structuralist and Schumpeterian thought), it has been argued that de-industrialisation is likely 
to have significant negative long-term effects on growth and employment.   
 This concern was particularly pronounced in countries that experienced drastic de-
industrialisation following the discovery of mineral resources  --  a phenomenon that became 
known as the ‘Dutch-Disease’.  The key issue is the double-edged effect of a mineral 
discovery.  On the one hand, it allows an expansion of expenditure, income and employment; 
but on the other, it could lead to contraction of the non-mineral traded sector.  This 
phenomenon was first analysed in the 1950s regarding the mixed effects of sudden increases 
in the price of wool for the Australian economy.  
 OECD countries began de-industrialising in the late-1960s, while some high-income 
developing countries in East Asia entered this phase in the late 1980s.  At about the same time 
some Latin American countries and South Africa also began to de-industrialise after radical 
economic reforms, despite their level of income per capita being far lower than other 
countries which began to de-industrialise earlier.  This latter process has been labelled 
‘premature’ de-industrialisation (Palma, 2005), and should not be confused with the so-called 
‘resource curse’ hypothesis: the poor macroeconomic performance of many mineral-exporting 
economies.   
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Sources: Calculations using ILO Databank; and for Taiwan, The Republic of China Yearbook of Statistics.  
Averages are weighted by economically active population.  Southern Cone=Argentina, Chile and Uruguay. 
NICs1=Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong.   
 
 
Source: Calculations using World Development Indicators (1984 and 2006).  NICs-1 does not include Taiwan.  
 
TABLE 1:  Manufacturing Employment (% of total)
Region 1960 1970 1980 1990 2003
Sub-Saharan Africa ………………….……… 4.4 4.8 6.2 5.5 5.5
South Africa 11.3 12.8 18.2 15.7 14.1
Latin America …………………………………………..A30...……………..15.4 16.3 16.5 16.8 14.2
Southern Cone and Brazil 17.2 17.5 17.3 17.9 13.1
Middle East and North Africa…………. 7.9 10.7 12.9 15.1 15.3
South Asia …………………………………………………………………………………….8.7 9.2 10.7 13.0 13.9
East Asia (excluding China)…………………….10.0 10.4 15.8 16.6 14.9
NICs 1 14.6 19.2 27.5 28.7 19.4
China …………………………………………………………………….10.9 11.5 10.3 13.5 12.3
Third World ……………………………………………....10.2 10.8 11.5 13.6 12.5
OECD……………………………………………………..26 5 26.8 24.1 20.1 17.3
TABLE 2: Manufacturing Value Added (% of GDP)
Region 1960 1970 1980 1990 2003
Sub-Saharan Africa…………………………….15.3 17.8 17.4 14.9 13.8
South Africa 21.0 23.9 22.5 25.5 18.1
Latin America……………………………. 28.1 26.8 28.2 25.0 16.7
Southern Cone and Brazil 32.2 29.8 31.7 27.7 16.9
Middle East and North Africa…………. 10.9 12.2 10.1 15.6 14.2
South Asia……………………………………………..…13 8 14.5 17.4 18.0 16.2
East Asia (excluding China)…………………….14.0 19.2 23.3 25.5 27.6
NICs 1 15.4 22.5 27.1 26.5 24.9
China………………………………………………...23.7 30.1 40.6 33.0 31.3
Third World…………………………………………..…21.6 22.1 24.3 23.9 22.7
OECD……………………………………………………..28 9 28.3 24.5 22.1 17.3
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2– THE FOUR SOURCES OF DE-INDUSTRIALISATION 
 
 
2.1-  The first source: an ‘inverted-U’ relationship between manufacturing employment 
and income per capita 
 
The most widely accepted concept of de-industrialisation emerges from an understanding of 
the relationship between manufacturing employment and income per capita as an ‘inverted-
U’.  De-industrialisation is simply the drop in manufacturing employment occurring when 
countries reach a certain level of per capita income  --  i.e., mature economies switching 
employment to specialised services as part of their ‘normal’ process of development.  As 
such, de-industrialisation could well have positive long-term growth effects.  According to 




Although many other analyses confirm this hypothesis, Palma (2005) has suggested 
that de-industrialisation has been a more complex phenomenon.  He argues that, in addition to 
the ‘inverted-U’, there are three further processes at work.   
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2.2.- The second source of de-industrialisation:  a declining relationship over time 
between income per capita and manufacturing employment 
 
 
One additional source of de-industrialisation has been the collapse of the ‘inverted-U’ 




Sources:  Palma (2005, using ILO Databank and the ‘Penn Tables’; this is the sources for all 
other graphs).  The regressions are based on a sample of 105 countries.  The range of the 
horizontal axis is the actual income-range of the sample for 2000.  In all regressions in this 
and following graphs, all parameters are significant at the 1% level, and the adjusted R
2 
are 
between 66% and 77%.  All regressions pass the relevant diagnostic tests.  Note that these 
regressions are simply a cross-sectional description of cross-country differences in 
manufacturing employment, categorised by income per capita; i.e. they should not be 
interpreted in a ‘predicting’ way, because there are a number of difficulties with a curve 
estimated from a single cross-section - especially regarding the homogeneity restrictions that 
are required to hold.  
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           In essence, for high- and middle-income countries a declining level of manufacturing 
employment was associated with income per capita over time.  In fact, the four better-known 
hypotheses originally developed to explain the ‘inverted-U’ relationship mentioned above are, 
in fact, more relevant to this ‘second source’ of de-industrialisation as until the mid-1980s no 
country had reached the level of income corresponding to the turning point of the respective 
curve.   
These hypotheses are:  
i)The fall in manufacturing employment is merely a statistical illusion caused 
primarily by the re-allocation of labour from manufacturing to services through contracting-
out of activities such as cleaning, security, catering, and data processing.  
ii)It results from a reduction in the income elasticity for manufactures; 
iii)It is the consequence of higher productivity growth in manufacturing; and  
iv)It is the result of a new international division of labour (including ‘outsourcing’), 
which reduces manufacturing employment in industrialised countries, especially for non-
skilled labour.   
Although a detailed analysis of the rôle of each of these factors in de-industrialisation 
is outside the scope of this entry (see Rowthorn and Ramaswamy, 1999), it is important at 
least to add that the 1980s switch in ‘policy regime’ in OECD countries (broadly speaking, 
from post-war Keynesianism to demand-constraining monetarism) did also contribute to the 
huge 1980s drop in manufacturing employment.  (For the 1980s debate on de-
industrialisation, see Singh, 1987).  The new technological revolution that emerged in the 
1980s also played a major rôle (Pérez, 2002).  
 
2.3.-  The third source of de-industrialisation:  changing income per capita 
corresponding to the turning-point of the regression 
 
 
This additional source of de-industrialisation is also evident in Figure 2.  This 
concerns the remarkable drop in the turning-point of the regressions during the 1980s, when it 
plummeted by half  --  from approximately $21,000 in 1980, to just over $10,000 in 1990 (in 
1985 international US$).  If until 1980 no country had reached the turning point of the curve, 
in 1990 there were more than 30 countries above that critical point.  (Rowthorn and Wells, 
1987, had discussed the possibility of the lowering in time of the turning-point of their 
‘inverted-U’ relationship).  However, Figure 2 also shows that during the 1990s this process 
was reversed, and by 2000 again no country was beyond that critical point.  This phenomenon 
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is crucial to the understanding of the changing dynamic of the interrelationship between these 
three sources of de-industrialisation.  Basically, during the 1980s there was a remarkable 
degree of de-industrialisation in high-income countries, which began to spread to middle-
income ones.  During the 1990s, by contrast, de-industrialisation affected mainly middle-





2.4.-  The fourth source of de-industrialisation:  the Dutch-Disease 
 
Finally, in several countries we can observe a further degree of de-industrialisation.  
These countries experienced a fall in their manufacturing employment that was clearly greater 










●Neth=The Netherlands; and Bra=Brazil. 
 
Rather than simple cases of 'overshooting', Palma (2005) identifies this phenomenon 
with a specific conceptualisation of the Dutch-Disease: in countries that have a export-surge 
of commodity or services, or a major shift in economic policy, a unique additional degree of 
de-industrialisation is typical (additional to the three de-industrialisation forces already 
discussed, that is).   
 Originally, Dutch-Disease had a narrow meaning  --  the appreciation of the real 
exchange rate resulting from a boom in commodity exports.  (For an analysis of the macro-
processes at work, see Corden and Neary, 1982, and Ros, 2000).  In other cases, mostly neo-
classical models, it simply referred to the adverse terms of trade effect for tradables following 
a sudden shift in its production frontier.  However, with time the meaning has widened to 
include all possible negative macro-economic effects associated with the “resource curse” 
hypothesis; for Woolcock et.al. (2001), for example, resource-rich countries are not very good 
at accumulating social capital.  (For a critical analysis of the “resource curse” hypothesis, see 
DiJohn, 2007).   
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 The origins of this “disease” lies in the fact that the relationship between 
manufacturing employment and per capita income tends to differ between countries able to 
generate a trade surplus in manufacturing and those that do not.  Note that the ‘trade-surplus-
in-manufacturing’ group includes economies that find themselves in this position out of 
necessity as well as others due to growth policy.  In the first case, given resource endowments 
force some countries to aim for a manufacturing surplus to finance inevitable trade deficits in 
commodities and/or services (e.g. Japan and India).  In the second, some resource-rich 
countries still try to implement a growth policy based on a strong ‘industrialisation agenda’ 
(e.g. Finland, Malaysia and Vietnam).   
 Figure 5 shows the long-term changes between manufacturing employment and 
income per capita in the ‘trade-surplus-in-manufacturing’ (mf) and ‘trade-surplus-in-primary-
commodity-or-services’ (pc) groups of countries.  
Although the ‘pc’ countries tend to reach a lower level of industrialisation at any given 
point in time, the ‘pc-effect’ per se has not led to a higher degree of de-industrialisation.  In 
fact, taking the highest point of the curves, in these four decades the share of manufacturing 
employment in both ‘mf’ and ‘pc’ countries dropped by about half.   
Figure 5 
 
●An intercept dummy differentiates the two groups of countries.   
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With this introduction, it is now possible to explain properly the concept of Dutch-
Disease.  There is a group of countries - both industrialised and developing  -  that exhibit a 
specific additional degree of de-industrialisation.  The Netherlands rightly gives its name to 
this phenomenon.  
From this perspective, what happened in the Netherlands was a discovery of a natural 
resource (gas) leading manufacturing employment to switch from an ‘mf’ structure to a ‘pc’ 
one.  When this occurs, as figure 6.A shows, the country experiencing this “disease” moves 
along two different paths of de-industrialisation.  The first path consists of the three processes 
of de-industrialisation discussed above (from ‘60-mf’ to ‘00-mf’).  The second corresponds to 
a further component of de-industrialisation resulting from the change in the reference group 
(from ‘mf’ to ‘pc’).  In this context, the Dutch-Disease should only be regarded as the extra 
level of de-industrialisation associated with the latter movement.  In the case of the 
Netherlands, then, it is the (five percentage points) difference between manufacturing 
employment falling from 30.5% of the total in 1960 to 19.6% in 2000 (hypothetical ‘mf’, non-




●Ne=The Netherlands; EU5=Germany, France, Italy, Belgium and Austria; and UCAN=United States, Canada, 
Australia and New Zealand.  
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Dutch-Disease is thus clearly not a phenomenon limited to the Netherlands or to the discovery 
of mineral resources; it has also occurred in other countries and for other reasons.  One case is 
the United Kingdom, which had a boom in oil and financial-services exports (see figure 6.B); 
as a result of this (and of Mrs. Thatcher) the trade balance in manufacturing switched from a 
surplus equivalent to 4% of GDP (late 1970s) to a deficit of 4% (mid-2000s).  Figure 6.C 
shows that, by contrast, the share of manufacturing employment in other EU countries fell 
only according to the changes in the ‘mf’ scenario.  In turn, Figure 6.D shows that, although 
four other industrialised countries (major commodity exporters throughout the period) also 
found themselves in the ‘pc’ category in 2000, they did not suffer from the Dutch-Disease 
simply because they already were in the ‘pc’ category from the start.  Consequently, although 
both the ‘EU-5’ and the ‘UCAN’ countries experienced a similar drop in the share of 
manufacturing employment (9.7 and 10.5 percentage points, respectively), neither switched 
from one reference group to another.  
 The phenomenon of the Dutch-Disease also occurred in countries that developed 
flourishing service-exporting sectors, such as tourism (e.g., Greece, Cyprus and Malta) and 
financial services (e.g., Switzerland, Luxembourg and Hong Kong); see Palma (2005).  
(Surges in remittances from workers living abroad have had a similar effect).   
 Finally, this “disease” was also experienced after 1980s in some Latin American 
countries (and South Africa) where state-led import-substituting industrialisation (ISI) had 
achieved industrialisation levels characteristic of the ‘mf’ group (despite the fact that these 
countries generated trade surpluses in commodities).  In this case, radical change of the 
economic policy regime (from ISI to comprehensive trade and financial liberalisation) 
resulted in Dutch-Disease; i.e., the transformation of their employment structure from a 
policy-induced ‘mf’ to a more ‘Ricardian’ resource-rich ‘pc’.   This transformation took place 
mainly due to large and sudden changes in relative prices (primarily the result of lower tariffs 
reducing the prices of tradables and surges of capital inflows overvaluing exchange rates), 
some increases in productivity (resulting from easier access to imported capital equipment), 
and the end of institutional support for manufacturing.   
 Brazil and the three Southern Cone countries experienced the greatest de-
industrialisation following their economic reforms, while also being among the countries of 
the region that had previously industrialised the most and that had subsequently implemented 
the most drastic reforms.  
 




●Ar=Argentina; Br=Brazil; Cl=Chile; Ur=Uruguay; and Ne=The Netherlands.  The year 1990 has been omitted 
not to ‘congest’ the graph.  South Africa’s share of manufacturing employment also fell from a ‘mf’ level in 
1980 to close to a ‘pc’ one in 2000.   
 
         These four Latin American countries began this period  --  as did the Netherlands   --  
with a level of manufacturing employment typical of countries aiming at a trade surplus in 
manufacturing ('60-mf'), even though these resulted from different causes.  The case of the 
Netherlands is due to its (pre natural gas) resource endowments, whereas in the four Latin 
American countries their position was the result of a ‘structuralist’ industrialisation agenda.  
And if both reached 2000 with levels of manufacturing employment typical of the ‘pc’ group, 
this was once again for different reasons: in the Netherlands, the discovery of a commodity at 
a ‘mature’ stage of industrialisation was decisive, whereas in Latin America the sharp reversal 
of the ISI policies was responsible.  Note that in the latter the ‘extra’ degree of de-
industrialisation (‘mf’ to ‘pc’) took place over and above the already mentioned huge collapse 
of the ‘mf’ path for middle-income countries during the 1990s (Figure 3).   
 From this perspective, the key difference between ‘premature de-industrialisers’ in 
Latin America and developing Asia in terms of the implementation of economic reforms is 
that in the former these seem to have obstructed their transition towards a more mature  --  
i.e., self-sustaining  --  form of industrialisation.  (For the concept of ‘self-sustaining 
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industrialisation’, see Kaldor, 1967).  Resource-poor and resource-rich Developing Asia, 




●M&T=Malaysia and Thailand.  3-year moving averages.  The relative decline of South Africa’s manufacturing 
sector is even greater than Brazil’s (though not as extreme as Argentina’s).   
Source: WDI (2006; manufacturing output measured in US$ 2000).  
  
Maybe Latin America is in desperate need of a touch of the so-called ‘East Asian 
Confucianism’; i.e., once a new development path has been chosen, a significant degree of 
pragmatism, self-confidence, a progressive capitalist élite, and an avant-garde political 
leadership can be of great assistance in policy-making success.  
 In sum, the Dutch-Disease should not be seen as simple 'overshooting' of de-
industrialisation, but as a specific type of 'excess' de-industrialisation.  In general, this has 
taken place for one of three different reasons: the discovery of natural resources (e.g., the 
Netherlands); the development of export-service activities, mainly tourism and finance (e.g. 
Greece in the former, and Hong Kong in the latter); and finally, changes in economic policy 
(e.g. Brazil and South Africa).  
 All the above types of de-industrialisation should also be distinguished from those of 
the late-1980s and 1990s in many Sub-Saharan economies and countries of the former Soviet 
Union and Eastern Europe, which experienced a process of de-industrialisation associated 
with a fall in income per capita that was associated with a reduction in manufacturing 
employment backwards: a case of “reverse” de-industrialisation.    
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 Finally, Finland, Sweden, Denmark, Malaysia, Vietnam and, to a lesser extent, other 
Southeast Asian resource-rich countries (such as Thailand and Indonesia) prove that there is 
no such thing as an unavoidable “curse of natural resources”.  Countries with high potential 
for developing commodities and export-services activities have sufficient degrees of policy-
freedom to follow ambitious and successful ‘industrialisation agendas’ (not least of the 
commodities themselves, as in the Nordic case and Malaysia).  Also, economic policies exist 
to avoid the Dutch-Disease in commodity- and export-services-booming economies (see 
Pesaran, 1984 and Palma, 2000).  However, as the Latin American experience in particular 
shows, it seems that as globalisation progresses, there are fewer and fewer countries willing to 
take advantage of such degrees of policy-freedom. This is not only because forces in the new 
international institutional and financial order are rapidly trying to reduce these degrees of 
policy-freedom, but also because of domestic changes in economic ideologies and the 
structure of property rights.  
 However, whether a process of structural change that includes ‘premature’ de-
industrialisation can deliver rapid and sustainable economic growth is another matter 
altogether; so is the issue of whether the current ‘premature’ de-industrialisation occurring in 




3.- DE-INDUSTRIALISATION  --  DOES IT MATTER ? 
 
 
           Rapid de-industrialisation has reopened an age-old debate in economic theory: is a unit 
value added in manufacturing equal to one in commodities or services, especially in terms of 
its growth-enhancing properties?    
 Although a detailed discussion of this debate is beyond the scope of this entry, from 
the perspective of de-industrialisation one can classify growth theories into three camps (in 
doing this, of course, one has to acknowledge the necessary degree of simplification which 
every classification of intellectual tendencies entails).  This requires a distinction between two 
concepts: ‘activity’ and ‘sector’.  Examples of the former are R&D and education; and of the 
latter manufacturing.  The first camp includes those (mainly neo-classical models) that treat 
growth as both ‘sector-indifferent’ and ‘activity-indifferent’.  Examples are Solow-type 
models (both traditional and “augmented” ones), and the branch of ‘endogenous’ theories that 
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associates growth with increasing returns which are activity-indifferent.  Examples are early 
“AK” models and more recent ones in which changes in the rate of growth are the result of 
the cumulative effect of market imperfections arising in the process of technical change.  
However, these imperfections, and the associated increasing returns, are somehow seen as 
stemming directly from within the production function (rather than being based on the use of 
R&D or the production of human capital).   
 The second camp still regards growth as ‘sector-indifferent’, but models it as ‘activity-
specific’ (e.g., Romer’s work and neo-Schumpeterian models).  In these models, increasing 
returns, though generated by research-intensive activities, are explicitly not associated with 
manufacturing activities as such, or with investment in manufacturing, nor do they allow for 
specific effects from manufacturing on R&D activities (except for the fact that investment in 
any sector could be ‘complementary’ to R&D through its effect on the profitability of 
research; see Aghion and Howitt, 1998).  Therefore, in these models there is no room for 
Kaldorian-style effects concerning investment embedding or embodying technical change.   
 Finally, in the third camp are those (mainly Post-Keynesian, Schumpeterian and 
Structuralist theories) that argue that growth is both ‘sector-specific’ and ‘activity-specific’ 
(but the latter only in the sense that it is specific to the nature of the sector involved).  For 
instance, the approaches to growth found in Hirschman, Kaldor, Kalecki, Prebisch, Thirlwall, 
and (arguably) Schumpeter follow this line of argument.  What is common to these ‘sector-
specific’ growth theories is that the pattern and the dynamic of growth are crucially dependent 
on the activities being developed.  In particular, there are specific capital accumulation effects 
on growth stemming from manufacturing.  The crucial difference between this camp and the 
previous two is that issues such as technological change, externalities, synergies, balance-of-
payments sustainability, and the capacity of developing countries to ‘catch up’, are directly 
linked to the size, strength and depth of the manufacturing sector.   
 Therefore, in terms of the possible growth-consequences of de-industrialisation, the 
first ‘growth-camp’ does not regard de-industrialisation as a particularly relevant growth-issue 
per se.  Even when it becomes a major growth or employment issue, this is only due to market 
imperfections; for example, Sachs and Warner (1997) argue that if neo-classical competitive 
conditions prevail a declining manufacturing sector implies no hindrance to growth or full 
employment.  Furthermore, for these growth theories, even if the discovery of natural gas did 
produce some structural changes in output and employment in the Dutch economy, labelling 
these transformations a “disease” would be a misleading dramatisation.  Also, from this 
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perspective, if ‘premature’ de-industrialisation in resource-rich countries consists of the 
transformation of employment structures from an artificially policy-induced ‘mf’ to a more 
Ricardian ‘pc’ path, that can hardly be bad for growth!    
 From the point of view of the second camp, de-industrialisation in ‘mature’ economies 
may or may not have an impact on growth per se; it would all depend on its specific form.  
For instance, it could actually result in a stimulus for growth if the “upward” de-
industrialisation in mature economies is associated with the reallocation of resources within 
manufacturing into more R&D-intensive products.  However, in the case of ‘premature’ de-
industrialisation in middle-income countries it is more difficult to argue from this approach 
that such a phenomenon could really be positive for long-term growth.  
 Finally, although finding it difficult to accommodate the concept of normal (or 
“upward”) de-industrialisation in mature economies, the third approach to economic growth 
understands de-industrialisation and the Dutch-Disease as clearly negative for long-term 
growth and employment  --  especially if it involves ‘premature’ de-industrialisation in 
developing countries.  The same is true of the current narrowing-down of the policy-space to 
fight them.  For example, an interpretation of the industrialised countries’ remarkable 
slowdown in productivity growth since the mid-1970s from this perspective would be that this 
could well be the result of ‘wrong’ policies (e.g., monetarism) and ‘wrong’ structural change 
(e.g., “financialisation”) excessively intensifying de-industrialisation in the 1980s.  
(“Financialisation” is the rise in size and dominance of the financial sector relative to the non-
financial sector, as well as the diversification towards financial activities in non-financial 
corporations).  And one interpretation of the remarkably poor growth performance of most 
Latin American economies and South Africa since economic reform, especially Brazil, would 
be that this is the likely (almost inevitable?) consequence of ‘premature’ de-industrialisation  -
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